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1 INTRODUCTION.
The Bowl Championship Series (BCS) agreement was created in 1998 to
match the top two NCAA Division I-A college football teams in a National
Championship game at the end of each season. As part of the agreement, the
official BCS Standings are used to pick which two teams most deserve to play
in the championship game and which teams should play in the other major
bowl games. The BCS Standings have significant financial ramifications,
as the National Championship Game and major bowl games yield financial
payouts to the conferences of the appearing teams projected to be $14–$17
million per team in 2007 [1]. In addition to this direct financial benefit, BCS
bowl appearances likely generate indirect gains from increases in both alumni
contributions and student applications. Before the BCS, the matchups in
many bowl games were determined according to conference traditions, so
matches between the #1 and #2 teams in the nation rarely occurred. At
times, this yielded multiple undefeated teams and co-National Champions
(most recently, Nebraska and Michigan in 1997). On other occasions, a single
team with an arguably easy schedule could go undefeated and be declared
National Champion by polls without ever having played a “major” opponent
(e.g., BYU in 1984).
The BCS system endeavors to address these problems while maintain-
ing the tradition of finishing the season with bowl games. Prior to 2004,
BCS Standings were determined by a combination of two polls (coaches and
sportswriters), selected algorithmic rankings, strength of schedule, losses,
and bonus points awarded for defeating highly-ranked teams. This system
double-counted key contributions, because reasonable polls and rankings al-
ready took losses and strength of schedule into account (see, for example,
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[4]). In 2004, the BCS instituted a formula that simply averages polls and
computer rankings, but the system continues to vary from year to year as
specific polls and computer systems are added and removed.
The fundamental difficulty in accurately ranking or even agreeing on a
ranking methodology for college football lies in two factors—the dearth of
games played by each team and the large disparities in types and difficul-
ties of individual schedules. For instance, should an undefeated team from a
purportedly weaker conference with few tough nonconference opponents be
ranked ahead of a “major conference” team that lost a game or two while
playing difficult opposition both in its conference and in its nonconference
matchups? While each game outcome is an imperfect paired comparison
between two teams, the 10–13 regular season games (including conference
championships) played by each of the 119 Division I-A football teams severely
limits the quantity of information relative to, for example, college and pro-
fessional basketball and baseball schedules. Moreover, most of the Division
I-A football teams play the majority of their games within their conferences,
and there are significant variations in the level of play across different con-
ferences that further complicate attempts to select the top two teams from
the available information. To make matters worse, it is not even clear what
the phrase “top two” should mean: does it refer to the two teams with the
best overall seasons or the two playing the best at the end of the season?
Despite the obvious difficulties, many systems for ranking college football
teams have been promoted by mathematically and computationally inclined
fans (see, for example, those listed by Massey [15]). Many of these schemes
are relatively complicated mathematically, making it virtually impossible
for the lay sports enthusiast to understand the ranking methodology and
its underlying assumptions. Worse still, essential details of many of the
algorithms currently used by the BCS are not even openly declared (the
only one completely declared in the public domain is the system by Colley
[6], though some others are at least partially explained). Of those that are
at least partially public, some include seemingly arbitrary parameters whose
effects are difficult to interpret, and others are tweaked periodically to obtain
the purportedly most reasonable ranking based on previous results.
In this article, we demonstrate that a simply-explained algorithm con-
structed by crudely mimicking the behavior of voters can provide reasonable
rankings. We define a collection of voting automatons (random walkers) each
of whom declares its preference for a single team. Each automaton repeat-
edly selects a game at random from its preferred team’s schedule and decides
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whether to change its preference to the opponent as biased by the game out-
come, preferring but not absolutely certain to go with the winner, repeating
this process indefinitely. In the simplest implementation of this process, the
probability p of choosing the winner is kept constant across voters and games
played, with p > 1/2 because on average the winner should be recognized as
the better team and p < 1 to allow a given voter to argue that the losing
team is still the better team (moreover, the p = 1 limit can be mathematically
more complicated in certain scenarios, as discussed in section 3). The voting
automatons are nothing more than independent, biased random walkers on a
graph connecting the teams (vertices) by their head-to-head games (edges).
These “voters” thereby obey idealized behavioral rules dictated by one of
the most natural arguments relating the relative ranking of two teams: “my
team beat your team.” Indeed, the statistics of such biased random walkers
can be presented as nothing more than the logical extension of this argument
repeated ad infinitum.
This algorithm is easy to explain in terms of the “microscopic” behavior
of individual walkers who randomly change their opinion about which team is
best (biased by the outcomes of individual games). Of course, this behavior
is grossly simplistic compared with real-world poll voters. In fact, under the
specified range of p, a single walker will never reach a definitive conclusion
about which team is the best; rather, it will forever change its allegiance
from one team to another, ultimately traversing the entire graph. However,
the “macroscopic” total number of votes cast for each team by an aggregate
of random-walking voters quickly reaches a statistically-steady ranking.
The advantage of the algorithm discussed here is that it can be easily
understood in terms of single-voter behavior. Additionally, it has a single
explicit, precisely-defined parameter with a meaningful interpretation at the
single-voter level. We do not claim that this ranking is superior to other al-
gorithms, nor do we review the vast number of ranking systems available, as
numerous reviews are already available (see, for example, [11], [20], [7], [14]
for reviews of different ranking methodologies and the list of algorithms and
“Bibliography on College Football Ranking Systems” maintained by [22]).
We do not even claim that this ranking algorithm is wholly novel; indeed,
the resulting linear algebra problem is in the class of “direct methods” dis-
cussed by Keener [11] and has many similarities to the linear algebra problem
solved by Colley [6]. Rather, we propose this random-walker ranking on the
strength of its simple interpretation: our intent is to show that this simply-
defined ranking yields reasonable results.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, we
give the mathematical definition of the ranking algorithm and examine its
statistical properties. In section 3, we investigate the algorithm’s asymptotic
behavior for extreme values of the probability p. In section 4, we present
results for special cases involving round-robin tournaments. We then examine
recent historical outcomes from real NCAA Division I-A seasons in section 5.
In section 6, we discuss properties of the graphs defined by the games played
in a given year according to real NCAA Division I-A schedules, paying special
attention to hierarchical structure and the interplay between that structure
and random-walker rankings. We conclude in section 7 by discussing some
possible generalizations of this ranking algorithm.
2 RANKINGWITH RANDOMWALKERS.
For each team i we denote the number of games it played by ni, its wins by
wi, and its losses by li. A tie, which was possible prior to the current NCAA
overtime format, is treated as half a win and half a loss, so ni = wi + li
always holds. The number of random walkers declaring their preference for
team i is denoted vi, and the condition that the total number of voters remain
constant is given by
∑
i
vi = Q.
If team i beats team j, then the average rate at which a walker voting for
team j changes its allegiance to team i is proportional to p, and the rate at
which a walker already voting for team i switches to team j is proportional
to 1 − p. For simplicity, we ignore the dates of games, selecting each of the
ni games played by team i with equal probability. To avoid rewarding teams
for playing more games, the rate at which a given voter considers a given
game is taken to be independent of ni. Under this selection of rates, we find
it more natural to express the independent random-walker dynamics using
ordinary differential equations (ODEs) instead of Markov chains, though our
entire discussion can certainly be recast in terms of Markov chains, in which
case the approach has some similarities with the PageRank citation ranking
[3] underlying the Google search engine (see [13]). Formulating the present
problem in terms of ODEs has the added advantage of avoiding complications
due to cycles of different lengths (such cycles could alternatively be removed
through explicit time-averaging).
The expected rate of change of the number of votes cast for each team in
this random walk is quantified by a homogeneous system of linear differential
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equations,
v′ = Dv , (1)
where v is the T -element vector of the number vi of votes cast for each of
the T teams, and the elements of the square matrix D are
Dii = −pli − (1− p)wi ,
Dij =
1
2
Nij +
(2p− 1)
2
Aij (i 6= j) , (2)
in which Nij is the number of games played between teams i and j and Aij is
the number of times team i beats team j minus the number of times i loses
to j. That is, if Nij belongs to {0, 1}, then
Aij =


+1 if team i beat team j ,
−1 if team i beat team j ,
0 if team i beat team j .
(3)
When two teams play each other multiple times, we obtain Aij as summed
over those games. Because 1/2 < p < 1, the off-diagonal elements Dij are
nonnegative and vanish if and only if Nij = 0.
Ideally, one would consider the giant connected component in the college
football schedule network, including Division I-A as a subgraph, but it was
easier to analyze the data (obtained from [9] and [23]) when the information
was selectively restricted to the graph of Division I-A teams. Because many
Division I-A teams play some non-I-A opponents, we represent all of these
connected non-I-A teams collectively as a single node. These teams usually do
not fare well against Division I-A competition, so this new “team” achieves a
low ranking and does not significantly affect the random walker populations,
except to penalize the Division I-A teams they defeat and to maintain the
constraint that the total number of votes Q remain constant (i.e., voters do
not leave the graph).
Equilibrium. The matrix D encompasses all the connections and win-loss
outcomes between teams. The steady-state equilibrium of (1,2) satisfies
Dv¯ = 0 (4)
and gives the expected populations v¯ of the random walkers voting for each
team. This information can then be used directly to rank the teams. Despite
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the simplistic behavior of an individual random walker, the behavior of an
aggregate of voters (or equivalently, because of the independence assumption,
the long-time average of a single voter) appears to yield reasonably robust
orderings of the top teams. Unsurprisingly, the number of votes cast for
a given team varies substantially for different values of p; nevertheless, the
relative ranking of the top few teams can remain similar across a wide range
of p, as we discuss for recent historical examples in section 5.
The equilibrium point v¯ lies in the null-space of D; that is, it is the
eigenvector associated with a zero eigenvalue. We stress that this equilibrium
does not require a no-net-flow detailed balance along each edge; rather, we
only require zero net flow out of each node. For instance, a schedule of three
teams (i, j, and k) in which each plays only two games such that i beats j,
j beats k, and k beats j leads to a cyclic flow of votes around the triangle
with a statistical equilibrium that arises when each team receives an equal
number of votes.
An important property of these random walkers is that the matrix D
yields a single attracting equilibrium v¯ for a given p in [1/2, 1), provided
the underlying graph representing games played between teams consists of a
single connected component. This can be proved in three steps:
1. The column sums of D vanish because the sum of the populations
remains constant, 0 = Q′ =
∑
i v
′
i =
∑
i
∑
j Dijvj (i.e., the dynamics
of the vj are confined to a hyperplane of codimension 1).
2. The off-diagonal elements of D are nonnegative and—once the graph
consists of a single connected component—all off-diagonal elements of
Dd are positive, where d is the diameter of the graph, so that vertices
with vj = 0 have growing populations. In other words, all average flows
enter the hyperquadrant in which vj > 0 for all j.
3. Finally, because (1) is linear, the only possibility consistent with the
foregoing observations is that there is a single attracting sink v¯ in the
hyperplane.
This argument breaks down if either the graph is not connected or p = 1,
because subgraphs with zero walker population can remain so. Alterna-
tively, one can recast (1)–(4) as an eigenvalue problem and apply the Perron-
Frobenius theorem, as described by [11]. However, given the random-walker
interpretation built into the rate matrices we define, our arguments already
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ensure that the expected populations achieve a unique attracting state, pro-
vided the graph consists of a single connected component and p < 1. In the
absence of these conditions, the Perron-Frobenius theorem cannot be applied
because the resulting matrices are no longer irreducible.
Statistics. Any initial voter distribution eventually randomizes completely,
so the steady-state distribution of the number of votes v¯i cast for the ith
team is binomial (for Q trials) with probability v¯i/Q, mean v¯i, and variance
v¯i(1 − v¯i/Q). The joint probability density function of two vertices is not
perfectly independent, as the sum over all vertices equals the number of
random walkers Q. However, it is still obtained from a binomial distribution
of Q random trials across the vertices. (The two of interest have probabilities
ri = v¯i/Q and rj = v¯j/Q.) We can exploit this fact to measure the confidence
in the relative ranking of two teams in terms of the minimum number of voters
Qmin required to ensure that the expected difference between the number
of votes cast for each team is larger than the standard deviation of that
difference:
Qmin =
ri + rj − (ri − rj)
2
(ri − rj)2
=
ri + rj
(ri − rj)2
− 1 . (5)
Because the statistical properties of the random walkers follow directly from
the linear algebra problem (1)–(4), there is no need to simulate independent
random walkers to obtain rankings. This simplicity disappears if interactions
between random walkers are included, as considered briefly in section 7.
3 ASYMPTOTICS AT LARGEAND SMALL
p.
For a given probability p the expected populations depend in a complex man-
ner on the details of game schedules and outcomes. In an attempt to clarify
the effects of selecting a given p, it is instructive to investigate analytically
the limiting behaviors near p = 1/2 and p = 1. We demonstrate, in par-
ticular, that the main contributions near p = 1/2 include a measurement of
schedule strength, whereas behavior near p = 1 is dominated by undefeated
teams and by subgraphs of teams that go undefeated against teams outside
the subgraph.
On any given Saturday. Consider p = 1/2 + ε, where ε ≪ 1. The rate
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matrix (2) becomes
Dij =
1
2
∆ij + εD˜ij ,
where ∆ is the graph Laplacian: ∆ij = 1 (i 6= j) if nodes i and j are
connected (the two teams played each other) and ∆ii = −ni. By (2), D˜ has
the same elements asA off the diagonal and the values wi−li on the diagonal.
A power series of the equilibrium probabilities, v¯j = v¯
(0)
j +εv¯
(1)
j +ε
2v¯
(2)
j + · · · ,
then satisfies
0 =
1
2
∆v¯(0) +
∞∑
k=1
εk
[
1
2
∆v¯(k) + D˜v¯
(k−1)
]
, (6)
subject to the normalization condition
∑
j v¯
(k)
j = Qδk0 for Q voters (δk0 = 1
when k = 0, otherwise δk0 = 0).
The O(ε0) contribution requires v¯
(0)
j = Q/T for each j, distributing the Q
votes equally across the T nodes of the graph. With D˜ij v¯
(0)
j = 2(wi− li)Q/T ,
the O(ε1) condition becomes
∑
j
∆ij v¯
(1)
j = −
4Q
T
(wi − li) . (7)
That is, the first correction v¯
(1)
j at p near 1/2 is a potential that satisfies a
discrete Poisson equation (subject to the constraint
∑
j v¯
(1)
j = 0) with charges
proportional to the win-loss record of each team. It thus incorporates the
record of the jth team and is also heavily influenced by the records of the
nearest neighbors and other close teams in the graph. In other words, the first
correction is strongly influenced by a “strength of schedule” notion. Further-
more, it is only with the second-order term v¯
(2)
j that information pertaining
to specific games won or lost by a given team begins to be incorporated, as
v¯
(1)
j includes only net records in (7).
Winner takes all. The asymptotic behavior for p = 1− ε (ε≪ 1) is more
complicated because the limiting state depends on the number of undefeated
teams and other schedule details. The single-equilibrium argument of section
2 breaks down at p = 1 because off-diagonal elements of Dd are not neces-
sarily positive. There can then be multiple equilibrium states, but only one
of these states is achieved in the limit as p→ 1.
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The simplest situation to consider asymptotically occurs when a single
undefeated team garners all random walker votes for p = 1 − ε as ε → 0.
This condition requires both that there be only a single undefeated and
untied team and that there be no subgraphs of other teams in the network
that collectively win all of their games against teams outside that subgraph.
The transition rates are then written Dij = D
(0)
ij −εD˜ij , and we again expand
v¯j = v¯
(0)
j + εv¯
(1)
j + ε
2v¯
(2)
j + · · · .
Here, D(0) agrees with (N +A)/2 off the diagonal but has the negation of
the number of losses by the corresponding teams on the diagonal (recall that
a tie counts as half a win and half a loss), and D˜ remains as defined earlier
in the perturbation around p = 1/2. The limiting state v¯
(0)
j = Qδju casts all
Q votes for the single undefeated team (“u”). Calculation of the first-order
correction then requires solution of D(0)v¯(1) = b, where bj = QD˜ju, which
offers neither simplification nor intuition beyond the original rate equations
(1)–(4).
4 ROUND-ROBIN EXAMPLES.
The asymptotic analyses of the previous section were necessarily limited by
the generality of possible schedule topologies. As a means of developing
further intuition, we consider the special cases of round-robin tournaments
in which every team plays every other team exactly once.
On any given Saturday (revisited). Returning to the case p = 1/2 + ε,
consider a round-robin tournament of T teams, each of which plays exactly
T − 1 games, one against each of the available opponents. Then the graph
Laplacian is the matrix with 1s off the diagonal and−(T−1) for each diagonal
entry. Subject to the constraint
∑
j v¯
(k)
j = 0 (k > 0), we immediately obtain∑
j ∆ij v¯
(k)
j = −T v¯
(k)
i , so (6) yields
v¯
(k+1)
i =
2
T
D˜v¯
(k)
i .
The zero-sum constraint is maintained because the column sums of D˜ are
identically zero by definition. This simple iterative relation for v¯
(k+1)
i can
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then be summed when ε < 1/2 (i.e., p < 1) to arrive at
v¯ =
[
I −
2ǫ
T
D˜
]−1
v¯(0) .
We make special note of the first-order correction. In section 3, we saw
that strength of schedule and the direct win-loss record both appear at O(ε).
Hence, one expects the win-loss record of an individual team to determine
its O(ε) contribution fully in the round-robin case, where everyone playing
everyone else removes schedule inequities. Indeed, equation (7) gives
v¯
(1)
i =
4Q
T 2
(wi − li) (8)
when applied to round-robin tournaments. Stated differently, the asymptotic
rankings near p = 1/2 in a round-robin tournament are linear, and the slopes
are set by the win-loss records.
Perfectly ordered teams. Because the asymptotic expansion for p =
1− ǫ is complicated by the difficult determination of the base state (ǫ = 0),
we consider this expansion only for the round-robin case of T “perfectly
ordered” teams, which we define as the special case where team i beats team
j whenever i < j. In this situation, the D(0) matrix of section 3 is upper
triangular, with 1s above the diagonal and Dii = −li = −(i − 1). Because
there are no cycles here, it is clear that the single undefeated team garners
all votes in the limit as ε→ 0, so v¯
(0)
i = Qδi1. We can then show that
v¯
(1)
i =
{
−(T − 1) if i = 1 ,
T/[li(li + 1)] if i > 1 .
Mixed ordering. Finally, it is worth asking whether round-robin tourna-
ments can give any indication about useful values of the bias parameter p.
Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that teams in a round-robin schedule
should be ranked in a manner consistent with their win-loss records, as their
schedules contain no inequities. A 6-5 team in a 12-team round robin should
presumably be ranked higher than a 5-6 team, even if only marginally so. As
we already saw from (8), the O(ε) term in an expansion with p = 1/2+ ε for
a round-robin competition does indeed agree with the rank ordering given
by win-loss records.
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Do the terms that are higher order in ε continue to respect the win-loss
ordering in a round-robin setting? Equivalently, what happens for values of
p further from 1/2? One might reasonably ask whether this win-loss ordering
is generically preserved for all p in the range 1/2 < p < 1 (it is not). It is
then natural to ask whether the win-loss ordering is always preserved up to
“crossing” values bounded away from 1/2. That is, for a given round-robin
outcome, we define pc to be the minimum p (≥ 1/2) such that the random-
walker ordering crosses from consistent to inconsistent with win-loss records.
We then ask whether pc is bounded from below.
However, it seems clear from examples of specific outcomes that there is
no lower bound for pc except for p = 1/2 (where, by definition, all teams
are ranked equally). We obtain pc arbitrarily close to 1/2 through a simple
modification to the perfectly-ordered tournament. Starting from a win-loss
matrix of T teams where team i beats j if i < j, we modify only the games
played by the team with the best losing record. To be precise, for even T
we change only games played by team k = (T/2) + 1, with (T/2) − 1 wins
and T/2 losses. We now swap the win-loss outcome of every game played by
team k except for the game between k and k − 1, which we maintain as a
win for team k − 1. These outcome switches modify the win-loss record of
every team except for teams k and k − 1; in particular, the latter still has
a better record than the former. Nevertheless, we observe numerically that
(pc− 1/2) ∼ T
−1 for these explicitly-constructed mixed-ordered round-robin
events, with team k ranked above team k − 1 above pc.
The realization that there is no lower bound for pc away from 1/2 indicates
an obvious limitation to this simply-constructed ranking system. Specifi-
cally, because the random walkers inherently represent first-place votes, rank-
ordered crossings involving teams ranked #T/2 and #(T/2)+1 are not very
surprising. The number of votes cast for each team in the statistical equilib-
rium is of course important, in that the few votes cast for the lowest-ranked
teams by design impact the number of votes cast for each team they play,
ensuring that strength of schedule is inherently incorporated. However, the
emphasis on highly-ranked teams means that a team can improve its rank-
ing by beating a highly-ranked team more than it might be penalized for
losing to a lower-ranked team. These round-robin examples then clearly call
into question the accuracy of the precise rankings of those middle teams and
thus lead to questions about the scheme as a whole. A system based only
on first-place votes should presumably be strongest in its ranking of the top
teams, though we have no mathematical proof that these walkers do so in
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any “optimal” sense. This motivates us to consider how the random-walker
rankings fare in comparison with the historical record.
5 RECENT HISTORY.
The utility of a ranking algorithm lies in its performance in the face of real
data. Accordingly, we investigated college football rankings for each season
from 1970 to 2005, restricting our discussion here to 2001 and 2002, as these
seasons represent recent extreme situations in attempting to pick the top
two teams (see, for example, [1]). The 2003, 2004, and 2005 seasons are
discussed on our web page [16], where rankings for future seasons will also
be maintained.
The only certainty in the 2001 pre-bowl rankings was that Miami be-
longed in the National Championship Game, because it was the only unde-
feated team in Division I-A. Indeed, both polls and all eight algorithms used
by the BCS that year picked Miami #1 going into the bowl games. That
season’s controversy concerned Nebraska’s selection as the #2 BCS team,
narrowly surpassing BCS #3 Colorado despite Colorado’s late-season rout
of Nebraska. The fact that BCS #4 Oregon had been ranked #2 in both
polls was also mentioned on occasion. After the bowl games, in which Miami
defeated Nebraska and Oregon defeated Colorado, it was Oregon’s absence
from the championship game that became the centerpiece of national con-
troversy. The random walkers select Oregon #2 for p > .5 up to p ≈ .62,
above which Nebraska takes #2 in a narrow range up to p ≈ .68. Above that
value, the random walkers defy conventional wisdom by selecting BCS #6
Tennessee as #2. In fact, they choose Tennessee as #2 over the widest range
of probabilities (see Figure 1a). This ranking is explained in part by the
fact that the simplest random-walking voter algorithm presented here does
not distinguish games based on the date played. Tennessee had been the
most likely team to be picked to face Miami until they lost the Southeastern
Conference (SEC) championship game on the final day before the BCS selec-
tions. Even with the loss (because the date of that loss does not affect things
here), the random walkers congregate near Tennessee, in part because the
SEC as a whole is highly ranked that season. Indeed, in the limit as p→ 1,
Florida is ranked #3 and LSU is ranked #4, with Oregon falling to #5 and
both Nebraska and Colorado falling completely out of the top ten. This SEC
near-dominance is generated by a number of nearly-undefeated subgraphs:
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Figure 1: Pre-bowl rank orderings of teams by the expected populations
of random walkers at different values of the probability p of voting for the
winner of a given game for (a) 2001 and (b) 2002.
Tennessee (10-2) lost to Georgia and lost to LSU the second time they played
(in the SEC championship), Florida (9-2) lost to Auburn and Tennessee, and
LSU (9-3) lost to Mississippi, Florida, and to Tennessee in their first meet-
ing. Not counting games against each other, this trio of closely-linked teams
had a collective 24-3 record prior to the bowl games, with all three losses
against SEC conference opponents, two of whom were played multiple times
by this group (Florida beat Georgia and LSU beat Auburn). Those three
losses came against teams who also had all but one of their losses in the SEC
(Auburn lost to Syracuse). Florida falls to #8 at smaller values of p (closer
to 1/2), and LSU is not even in the top ten for p below ≈ .77. Nevertheless,
they continue to help Tennessee’s ranking.
In contrast, the BCS system worked virtually without controversy in se-
lecting teams for the National Championship Game at the end of the 2002
season, as there were precisely two undefeated teams, both from major con-
ferences. Both polls picked Miami and Ohio State as the top two teams,
in agreement with six of the seven ranking algorithms used that year. The
only nonconformist was the New York Times ranking system, which picked
Miami and USC as the top two teams—the latter presumably in part due to
its difficult schedule. For p ≈ 1/2, the random walkers also rank USC in the
top two based on the strength of its schedule (see Figure 1b), but they agree
across most values of p that the top two teams are Miami and Ohio State.
One can explore the differences between the 2001 and 2002 pre-bowl re-
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Figure 2: Degree of confidence in the ordering of pairs of teams in the (a)
2001 and (b) 2002 pre-bowl rankings, as quantified by 1/Qmin, where Qmin
denotes the minimum number of independent random walkers necessary to
ensure that the standard deviation of the difference between the expected
populations of two teams is smaller than the expected difference (see equation
(5)).
sults further by exploiting the statistical properties of expected vote totals to
express a measure of confidence in the resulting rankings. The Qmin required
to distinguish successfully between the top rank-ordered pairs of teams, de-
fined by (5) in section 2, is plotted for the 2001 and 2002 pre-bowl rankings in
Figure 2. In particular, we note that the relative numbers of voters required
to distinguish #1 from #2 in 2001 and #2 from #3 in 2002 are significantly
smaller (indicating a higher degree of confidence in the chosen ordering) than,
in particular, the distinctions between #2 and #3 in 2001 or #1 and #2 in
2002. One should, of course, be careful in applying this measure of confidence
too broadly, because the percentage of total votes that remain available to
distinguish #4 from #5 will in general be smaller than those available to
distinguish #1 from #2. Accordingly, direct comparisons of the same rank
distinction across different years are more reasonable. For example, observe
the typically lower degree of confidence in distinguishing #3 from #4 and
#4 from #5 in 2001 (when Nebraska, Colorado, Oregon, and Tennessee were
all trying to lay claim to the #2 spot) compared with the situation in 2002.
After seeing these results, we should discuss at least briefly which values
of p might yield good rankings. Perhaps neither the dominance of strength
of schedule near p = 1/2 (as illustrated, for example, by USC in 2001) nor
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Figure 3: Wins and losses plotted according to the 2001 pre-bowl rankings
of each team at p=0.8, given by the expected fraction of random walkers
populating (“voting for”) each team.
the emphasis on undefeated seasons near p = 1 (e.g., BYU in 1984) are
appropriate. Rather, we might naively argue that a balanced value of p is
preferred.
Alternatively, we could consider various objectives for optimizing p. For
instance, Figure 3 shows the organization of the win-loss outcome of every
game in the 2001 pre-bowl schedule according to the random walker popula-
tions determined with p = 0.8. The votes are not (of course) strictly ordered
according to the winner and loser of each individual game, but the winners
have more votes on average. Instances where a higher-ranked team has lost
to a lower-ranked team are frequently referred to as “ranking violations”
and can be used to construct one measure of the quality of different ranking
systems (see the comparisons page maintained by Massey [15]). Addition-
ally, the goal of minimizing the number of such violations and determining
rank orderings from the multitude of such nonunique minimizations can it-
self be used to define ranking algorithms [5], [18]. An obvious optimization
procedure here is to select p to minimize the number of ranking violations.
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While we observe that this optimal p varies from year to year, it frequently
takes a value near the center of the allowed interval. Other measures of the
quality of the ranking may be naturally inspired by Figure 3; for example,
we might minimize the violations in another norm, such as one giving their
distance from nonviolation. Another approach based on logistic regression
of a generalized version of the present ranking system has been implemented
by Kvam and Sokol [12] for college basketball, where the best p transition
probabilities include information about point spread and home-court advan-
tage. Finally, we might wonder whether some optimization would connect
this class of “direct methods” [11] to the more statistically-sophisticated
maximum likelihood methods originally used for paired comparisons in the
pioneering works of Zermelo [24] or Bradley and Terry [2]. Rather than con-
tinuing these lines of inquiry here, we instead focus our remaining attention
on trying to understand the connections between our biased random walkers
and the properties of the underlying networks.
6 NETWORK STRUCTURE.
The voting automatons randomly walk on a graph consisting of the Division I-
A football teams (vertices) connected by the games played between the teams
(edges). We note that this is not the only ranking system motivated by direct
interest in the underlying network; indeed, while the random walkers here
provide rankings through their dynamics on the network, Park and Newman
[19] have developed a ranking system determined completely by the directed
graph defined by wins. Because the random walkers propagate in a strongly
heterogeneous network topology, it is important to try to understand how
that topology affects the walkers’ behavior and the resulting rankings.
Each NCAA Division I-A football season consists of 650–750 games be-
tween about 115 teams (119 in 2005). In every season since 1990, this graph
becomes a single connected component by the third or fourth week of the
season (without counting faux connections via the single “non-I-A” node
that we include for simplicity). The relative quickness in achieving a single
connected component (after only about two hundred games) results in part
because schools typically play many of their nonconference games at the be-
ginning of a season. The degree of each vertex—that is, the number of games
played by each team—varies in a narrow range. Each vertex has between ten
and thirteen edges prior to the bowl games and between ten and fourteen
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connections after the bowl games. The diameter of the graph, determined
by counting the number of edges along the longest geodesic path, is 4 in
every post-bowl graph since 1970. We also considered the local clustering
coefficient Ci for the ith team in the network (see [21], [17]), given by
Ci =
number of triangles connected to vertex i
number of triples centered on vertex i
. (9)
Unsurprisingly, clustering coefficients provide one means of identifying the
strong heterogeneity of the network. Each conference typically has a different
average local clustering coefficient, which also varies from the coefficients
computed for independent teams such as Notre Dame and Navy.
Several other network properties can also be calculated (including average
path lengths and various notions of centrality and connectedness; see, for
example, [17]), but such computations do not necessarily help explain the
random-walker statistics. An important exception is the graph’s “community
structure” [8], which indicates the hierarchies present in the network and is
useful for understanding the nature of the conference scheduling and the
resulting effect on the random-walker statistics. We computed community
structure using the notion of “edge betweenness,” defined as the number of
geodesics that traverse each edge, using the algorithm given by [8]. Briefly,
the edge with the highest betweenness is removed from the graph, and the
betweenness is recalculated for this modified graph to determine the next
edge to remove; the process is then repeated until no edges remain. The
removal of some of these edges breaks a connected component of the graph
into two parts, grouping the network into a hierarchy of communities as
the algorithm is iterated. Girvan and Newman [8] demonstrated that their
algorithm closely reproduced the predefined conference structure of the 2000
football schedule, and we found similar results for other years.
Using the 2001 season as an example, Figure 4 portrays the college foot-
ball community structure. The conferences and their subdivisions are reason-
ably reconstructed based on their relative strengths of community, and the
tree (“dendrogram”) in the figure indicates the relative closeness of different
conferences and of the independent teams. Note, for example, the close con-
nections between Notre Dame, Navy, and the Big East (from Virginia Tech
counterclockwise to Miami (Florida)).
This community structure is intimately linked to the dynamics of the
random-walking voters, as the specific pairings of interconference games and
the outcomes of those games strongly influence the flow of voters into and
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Figure 4: Graphical depiction of the community structure of the 2001 pre-
bowl network at p = 0.7, with gray-scale coding of the average votes per
team for each community.
out of the given conferences and more general structures such as the divisions
inside large conferences and larger hierarchical groups of conferences. The
2001 pre-bowl community structure in Figure 4 is gray-scaled according to
the average number of voters per team at each level of the hierarchy (for
p = 0.7). Such a plot indicates the relatively high vote counts given to the
SEC, Pacific-10 (Pac-10), and Big 12; it also shows the significantly smaller
average vote counts for Big East teams, despite Miami’s first-place standing.
We further quantify the importance of the relationships between confer-
ences by directly measuring the effect of reversing the outcomes of individual
games. Keeping the games in the order in which their respective edges were
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Figure 5: The effect of reversing the outcome of a single game played between
teams j and k, quantified by
∑
i 6=j,k |v¯i|
2 (for p = 0.7) and plotted versus the
order of that game according to edge removal in the community structure
determination.
removed in developing the community structure, we measure the difference
between the original voter populations and the new populations calculated
with the win-loss outcome of that single game reversed. The dominant effect
of such reversals is to change the rankings of the two teams involved in that
game, so we calculate the change to the global distribution of votes with the
quantity
∑
i 6=j,k |v¯i|
2, where the edge removed corresponds to a game between
teams j and k. Plotting this quantity (see Figure 5) versus the order of the
edge removed reveals a sharp transition in average magnitude between the
first approximately two hundred edges and those that follow. This corre-
sponds roughly to the number of edges removed in the community structure
determination at which the hierarchy breaks up into the different conferences;
these first couple hundred edges removed are predominantly interconference
games, whereas those that follow are intraconference games
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7 DISCUSSION.
We have developed a simply-defined ranking algorithm in which random
walkers adjust their “votes” for the best team on the network of teams con-
nected by their head-to-head games, with a single explicit parameter de-
scribing the preference towards selecting the winner of a given game. We
investigated the asymptotic behavior of this algorithm in the two extremes
of the probability parameter, paying special attention to round-robin tour-
naments, and explored the results of the 2001 and 2002 NCAA Division I-A
college football seasons in detail. More recent seasons are discussed on our
website [16]. Finally, we have connected the rankings to the underlying net-
work of games played by Division I-A teams, quantitatively demonstrating
the importance of interconference game outcomes and the relation to the
community structure of the graph.
Of course, many generalizations of the random-walker ranking algorithm
described here are possible, ranging from trivial redefinitions of the rate
matrix D to fundamental changes in the mathematical tools required to in-
vestigate the random-walking voters. The simplest generalizations are those
that modify the rate matrix D without changing the independence of the
random walkers themselves. For instance, one can readily incorporate mar-
gin of victory, home-field advantage, and game date into the definition of D
by replacing the constant probability p of voting for the winner with a func-
tion that includes these components (see, for example, [12]). The resulting
transition rates of walking each direction on a single edge are still defined by
the outcome of the game represented by that edge, and the associated lin-
ear algebra problem determines the probability distribution of each state. It
would be natural to make the probability of going towards the winner along
a given edge higher for a larger margin of victory or for a game won on the
road. However, incorporating any such qualitative assertions into quantita-
tive variations in the transition rates requires adding more parameters to the
ranking algorithm and determining reasonable values of those parameters, in
stark contrast to the minimalist philosophy espoused here.
Alternatively, each random walker can be assigned two votes instead of
one. This change is particularly sensible if the point is to select the two teams
to play head-to-head in the National Championship Game. We considered
such rankings generated from random walkers, each of whom holds two equal
votes (as opposed to a #1 vote and a separate #2 vote), using the same
probability parameter p, subject to the additional constraint that a given
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voter must cast the votes for two different teams. This two-vote constrained
random walk is most easily understood in terms of independent random
walks on the (significantly larger!) network in which each vertex represents
a possible pair of votes and the edges between vertices include games played
between teams representing one of the two votes, with the other vote held
fixed. This again immediately reduces to a linear algebra problem for the
expected percentage of votes garnered by each team, although it has much
higher rank: T (T−1)/2 for T teams. Clearly, further increases in the number
of votes given to each random walker would quickly make the state space
so large that solving the exact linear algebra problem would no longer be
computationally feasible.
As examples, we considered this two-vote generalization for pre-bowl
rankings for both 2001 and 2002. Our results were unremarkably similar
to our single-vote rankings. In particular, in comparison with the single-vote
2001 case, Miami can (of course) obtain only half the votes in the limit as
p → 1 because of the constraint that each walker casts the two votes for
two different teams, leaving fifty percent of the votes available to select a
#2 team. That fifty percent becomes widely divided among the available
candidates, with Tennessee and Oregon getting the largest shares at roughly
five percent each. Meanwhile, this major change in the expected populations
causes only relatively small changes in the rank orderings, except at extreme
values of p, where Tennessee and the rest of the SEC do not fare quite as
well here near p = 1 as they do in the single-vote scheme (though Tennessee
still maintains the #2 spot at most values of p). At p = 0.75, the single-vote
and two-vote systems agree on the same top sixty teams in the 2001 pre-bowl
rankings, save for swaps in the orderings of #19-20 and #48-49; at p = 0.9,
the top twenty-five are identical; at p = 0.95, however, there are switches
in the orderings of #3-4, #5-6, and #9-10 (SEC teams Florida, LSU, and
Georgia all do better in the single-vote algorithm), while the rest of the top
twenty-five remains identical. Not unexpectedly, the 2002 two-vote rankings
are very similar to the single-vote values, with Miami and Ohio State split-
ting the votes in the limit as p → 1. Even at p = 0.95, the top eighteen
teams are identical except for a reversal in the ordering of #6-7.
One can also consider generalizations that destroy the independence of
individual random walkers. For example, voter decisions could be influenced
by the number of other walkers voting for each team in a head-to-head game.
Whether they are inclined to follow the crowd or to try to be nonconformist,
such dependence between the random walkers makes the calculation of their
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aggregate behavior nonlinear and removes most of our knowledge about the
probability distributions of votes per team. Another interesting generaliza-
tion would be to weigh more strongly the effects of upsets by increasing
the flow of votes towards a lower-ranked team that beats a team with more
votes. Of course, this flow increase might reverse the ordering of the two
teams, thereby removing the upset character and reducing the flow towards
the winning team of that game, so there may not even be a statistically-steady
ordering of the two teams. A similar complication occurs if one breaks the
independence of the walkers by adding a bonus for beating a team ranked
in (for example) the top ten that reduces the probability of voting for the
loser. This reduced flow towards the losing team could then knock them
out of the top ten, thereby causing the bonus to disappear, and allowing the
team to rise back into the top ten, and so on. Obviously, the study of any
of these interacting random walkers is significantly more difficult than the
independent walkers considered in this article.
As a last consideration, we return to our discussion in section 4 of crossing
probabilities pc for round-robin competition and the observation that pc can
be very close to 1/2 when a team with a worse record won its games against
quality opponents, such as the specific mixed ordering we considered. The
random walkers then reward a team more for its high-quality wins than
they penalize it for its low-quality losses. This issue can be easily corrected
by introducing a new ranking according to the difference of expected vote
populations obtained with parameter p (“first-place votes” rewarding high-
quality wins) and those obtained with 1 − p (“last-place votes” penalizing
low-quality losses). For the specific mixed ordering considered in section 4
this “first-last” generalization gives pc & .77 for large T , while Monte Carlo
searches preliminarily suggest that pc may indeed be bounded away from
1/2 for these first-last random walker rankings for round-robin tournaments.
While this improvement is mathematically more satisfying than the situation
for the original “first-only” rankings, the first-only and first-last rankings
nevertheless generally agree on the top teams for real football seasons. For
instance, in the recently-concluded 2005 season these two pre-bowl rankings
at p = 0.75 agree on the ordering of the top twelve teams except for a
#10-11 swap, with the revised (“first-last”) system giving a slightly smaller
number of ranking violations than the first-only system (complete rankings
are available from [16]).
After eight seasons, the Bowl Championship Series remains as contro-
versial as ever. Even when the system yields an uncontroversial National
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Championship Game because two teams clearly separate themselves from
the field (as in 2002 and 2005), the BCS is still unable to escape controversy.
The treatment of the so-called mid-major (or “non-BCS”) conferences re-
mains an important issue (see, for example, [4]), leading to a December 2005
Congressional hearing in a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee [10].
We remain committed to the proposition that the use of algorithmic rank-
ings for determining the college football postseason will only become widely
accepted when those rankings have been reasonably explained to the public.
In that context, the random walker rankings (and their first-last generaliza-
tion) provide reasonable ways to rank teams algorithmically with methods
that can be easily explained and broadly understood.
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